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DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AMENDMENTS

TO

2 MARCH 1951 CIA DRAFT, NIE-29: YUGOSLAVIA

1. Reference page 2, par. 3, line 6: Change as follows: ". . . .
ellites the capability of launching a ~~successful~~ major invasion of. ."

2. Reference page 2, par. 4: Delete and substitute as follows:

~~"Yugoslavia could not defend itself against a sustained attack by the
four neighboring Satellite powers (Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and
Albania) if this attack were conducted under unified command and with
full logistical support from the USSR. The Yugoslavs would resist,
however, and would conduct guerrilla-type operations for some time
after the collapse of formal military resistance."~~ "In the event of
a major sustained Satellite attack on Yugoslavia, under Soviet central
direction, the advantages which they would possess in full Soviet logis-
tical support, substantially greater numbers of troops, and superiority
in mechanized forces, would insure eventual collapse of formal military
resistance. The Yugoslavs would resist, however, and would conduct
guerrilla-type operations long after the collapse of formal military
resistance."

3. Reference page 3, par. 6, line 3: Add the following: ". . . .
period of resistance to a full-scale Soviet-Satellite attack, and would
greatly increase the cost thereof to the Soviet Union. Conceivably the
expectation of such a cost, particularly when considered also in connec-
tion with the risk of general war, might be sufficient to discourage the
launching of such a venture."

Review of this document by CIA has
determined that
CIA has no objection to declass
it contains information of CIA
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MAR 5 1951
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4. Reference page 3, par. 7: Change to par. 9.
5. Reference page 3, par. 8: Change to par. 7.
6. Reference page 4, par. 9: Change to par. 8 and rewrite as

follows: ~~"The Kremlin may estimate that a Satellite invasion of Yugoslavia could be carried through successfully without precipitating general war, and may consider the risk of general war to be less in 1951 than later. While the USSR would probably not decide to launch a Satellite attack on Yugoslavia in 1951 unless it is willing to accept a substantial risk of precipitating general war. On the basis of available intelligence we are unable to determine in fact if the Soviets have made the decision to attack Yugoslavia in 1951. While the USSR probably would not decide to launch any attack on Yugoslavia in 1951, unless it is willing to accept the risk of precipitating general war, the Kremlin may estimate that the important relation of Yugoslavia to the Western world has not yet been sufficiently realized by the West, and hence that a Satellite invasion of Yugoslavia could be carried through successfully in 1951 without precipitating general war; they may consider that the risk of general war increases after 1951. We believe such an attack in 1951 must be considered a real serious possibility."~~

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☒ CIA has no objection to disclosure
it contains information of CIA
interest that must remain
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Authority: HM 10-2
Date: *2/15/51*
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MAR 5 1951
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do if invited upon

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